August 22, 2025
Samuel Williams v. Los Angeles Dept of Water and Power, psi (&/29/25)(ADJ 14421256; ADJ13440052).
Issue = Disqualification of a Judge.
Decision = Reconsideration dismissed, removal denied, disqualification unsuccessful.
Rationale & Supporting rules = Applicant filed, in pro per, a petition for reconsideration and petition for removal complaining of bias on the part of a WCJ. With respect to the issue of disqualification (which Applicant did not specifically allege, but implied), Section 5311 controls. Section 5311 allows disqualification on one or more of the grounds specified in Code of Civil Procedure section 641. One of the grounds under section 641 is that the WCJ has “formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to the merits of the action (CCP 641(f)) or that the WCJ has demonstrated “[t]he existence of a state of mind … evincing enmity against or bias toward either party.” (CCP 641(g)).
The procedure for showing this is set forth in 8 CCR 10960. It requires the filing of a petition for disqualification supported by an affidavit under penalty of perjury stating in detail facts establishing one or more grounds for disqualification. It must be filed not more than 10 days after service of notice of hearing after grounds for disqualification are known. In this case, the in pro per applicant did not comply with these rules, and his complaints were therefore summarily dismissed.
Antonio Franco (Deceased); Veronica Soto Villegas (Guardian ad Litem and trustee) v. Orange County Plastering Company; Cypress Ins. Co. (ADJ7148489)(7/14/25)
Issue = Does a “stepchild” get death benefits under LC 3501 even though the word “stepchild” is not used in assigning dollar benefits to dependents?
Decision / rationale = Although Labor Code section 3501 does not include the word “stepchild” for purposes of outlying specific dollar liability of Defendants to “dependents” it was harmonized with Section 3503. Labor Code section 3503, which generally addresses whom may qualify as dependents states in relevant part “[n]o person is a dependent of any deceased employee unless in good faith a member of the family household of the employee, or unless the person bears to the employee the relation of spouse, child, posthumous child, adopted child or stepchild . . .” (LC 3503). The close proximity of this provision equating children with adopted children and stepchildren for purposes of dependent death benefits suggests that the word “child” in section 3501 may be interpreted to extend to the more general definition in Section 3503.
Dependency of the stepchild found.
Jackson v. City of Oakland, PSI (ADJ3726460)(8/12/2025)
Issue = When are payments of PD due?
Decision-Rationale = Per LC 4650(b)(1), if an injury causes permanent disability, the first payment shall be within 14 days of the last payment of temporary disability (save for an exception wherein the injured worker returns to work at full wages). In this regard, when an injured EE is receiving permanent disability payments per LC 4650(b)(1), and is determined to be PTD (100%), the defense shall pay permanent total disability indemnity retroactive to the date its statutory obligation to pay TTD terminated. (Citing Brower v. David Jones Constr. (2014) 79 CCC 550).
In this case, Defendant was ordered to pay retroactive PTD benefits starting in 1988 payable to present date (because the Applicant was found to be TPD in 2017 and the case never resolved thereafter).
Brabant v. Salina’s Union High School District./Intercare (ADJ19399039)(*/11/2025)
Issue = What is a psychiatric injury/ what are the standards?
Decision/Rationale = In this case, a teacher witnessed the effects of his daughter’s injury at his place of employment (i.e., teacher worked where his daughter went to school). Teacher filed a psyche claim, which Defendant denied arguing that while the employment location acted as a stage, the injury was a personal injury that was not compensable. Defendant further argued that teacher witnessed the after-effects/the aftermath (which was not at work), and the matter involved a unique risk created by having the child of the teacher on the same campus.
The Appeals Board first discussed the standard for a “psyche” injury under LC 3208.3(a): there must be a diagnosis of a mental disorder which causes disability or the need for treatment under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Here, Applicant was diagnosed/treated for PTSD. Applicant’s testimony and medical reporting supported ongoing symptoms and triggers— which supported the “predominant” cause standard under LC 3208.3(b)(1).
The Board pointed out that what constitutes a work-related injury is broad; and the determination of whether or not an injury arises out and in the course of employment is based on “criteria” that are “fluid” and “must therefore be decided on the facts peculiar to each case.”
Thus, while this was a unique case, the evidence presented complied with LC 3208.3 and injury AOE/COE for psyche was awarded.
